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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent, )
-VS-

Case No. 14318

GARY ROWAN BUTLER,
Defendant and Appellant.

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a criminal case wherein the Defendant and Appellant
was charged with and convicted of the offense of Manslaughter.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Defendant and Appellant was convicted of the offense of
Manslaughter by jury verdict returned on August 8, 1975.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant and Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction of
Manslaughter

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 2 -

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant, Butler, from September 1, 1974 until February 18,
1975, was a police officer employed by the City of St. George, Utah.
(T. 1286).

Prior to that time he had been employed as a reserve

police officer for the City of St. George (T. 1286) and also was
employed by Safeway Stores in both the Ogden and St. George, Utah
areas (T. 1281).

At the time of his employment as a police officer

Butler was married to Alayne Butler (T. 1279) who was employed by
the St. George Police Department as a dispatcher (T. 1287, 1288).
During all of the time herein mentioned, the St. George City Chief
of Police was one Joe Hutchings (T. 1289), who had a brother by the
name of Gordon Hutchings who was also an employee of the City of
St. George (T. 1296).

Mr. Gordon Hutchings was employed by St.

George as a mechanic (T. 1296) whose duties included keeping the
City Police cars in proper repair (T. 1297).
During the later part of November of 1974 or the early part
of December of that same year Butler became aware of some type of
relationship existing between Gordon Hutchings and his wife, Alayne
Butler (T. 1297).

He developed reason to believe that this

relationship was more than casual and began doing various and sund
things to check into it (T. 1298).

In addition, he received an

anonymous letter signed "your fellow police officer" that warned \
sexual relations were occuring between Gordon Hutchings and Butle:
wife (T. 1301).

Butler questioned his wife at times about the

relationship but she denied that any existed (T. 1314).
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at times, caught his wife in what he considered to be lies about
the relationship which was upsetting to him (T. 1314).
On the evening of December 7, 1974 (T. 1315) Butler discovered
that his wife, Gordon Hutchings and one Jim Shelton had traveled to
Pine Valley, a small resort town north of St. George for purposes
of having a "party" (T. 1317).

He discussed the matter with his

police sergeant (T* 1324) and at two o'clock that morning had a
discussion with his wife upon her return (T. 1327).
told him it was none of his business (T. 1327).

She, in effect,

On or about the

18th of December, 1974 Butler reported the relationship of Gordon
Hutchings and Alayne Butler to Hutchings' wife (T. 1324).

Thereafter

Mrs. Hutchings was kept fairly advised of the goings on between the
parties.
Sometime around the 28th of December, 1974 Butler found a note
in his wife's desk (T. 1343) signed by "Z", which was the nickname
of Gordon Hutchings (T. 1344), which told Mrs. Butler that he, Gordon
Hutchings, loved her (T. 1346).

Later Butler discovered his wife

and Hutchings meetin in the so-called "police lounge" at the
St. George Police station (T. 1352).
On January 1, 1975 Butler went to the home of Gordon Hutchings
and asked him to stay away from his wife (T. 1357).

At that time

Hutchings threatened Butler if he ever came back to the Hutchings
home (T. 1358).

On January 2, 1975, Butler complained to his Chief

of Police, Joe Hutchings, about the affair his brother was having
with Butler's wife, and Hutchings told him that if any further
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- 5 made to Butler by Hutchings directly and through Mrs* Hutchings,
certain other parties advised Butler that he could be in trouble
with Hutchings (T. 1388).
On February 14, 1975 Mrs. Butler advised her husband that the
affair between her and Hutchings was over (T. 1407).

The following

day Hutchings advised Butler of the same thing (T. 1409).
On February 18, 1975 Butler spent the day with his wife in
cleaning out the parties1 trailer at Washington, Utah, a small
community about five miles east of St. George (T. 1413).

At about

seven o'clock p.m. the Butlers went to Mrs. Butler's apartment in
St. George for dinner (T. 1415) and Butler returned to his trailer
in Washington to change clothes at ten minutes to nine that evening
(T. 1416).

The reason for the change of clothes was that Butler

went on duty as a St, George City policeman at 10:00 that evening
(T. 1416).

Mrs. Butler remained in the apartment (T. 1417) and

Butler attempted to call her there about ten minutes after he left
but Mrs. Butler was not home (T. 1417).

In fact, Gordon Hutchings

was waiting until Butler left outside the apartment so that he could
meet with Mrs. Butler (T. 1129).

Butler thereupon put on his police

uniform (T. 1417) and traveled to St. George and went to his wife's
apartment (T. 1417).

He observed that her car was not at home

(T. 1418) and then went to the police station and picked up his
police car (T. 1418).

Butler thereupon called Mrs. Hutchings and

advised her he thought Hutchings and his wife were together (T. 1419)
and then started looking for Alayne Butler and Hutchings (T. 1419).
He checked various and sundry places he thought his wife might be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and then returned to the St. George police station.
During the course of the evening and prior to the time Butler
returned to the police station, one Tom Semmons, a patrolman hired
by the residents of Bloomington had discovered a Mustang automobile
in an isolated part of the Bloomington Hills area of Washington
County (T. 1247).

He called for a registration check of the vehicle

and found the vehicle to be a Mustang registered to Gary Butler
(T. 1248).

The police dispatcher at the time was one Sharlene

Squire (T. 1423) who knew that the Butler car was at Bloomington
Hills (T. 1423).
Upon his return to the police station Butler threatened to go
to Pine Valley to look for the couple (T. 1424) and at that time
Squire told him where his car was (T. 1424).
at the time (T. 1423, 1424).

Butler was very upset

Butler proceeded to Bloomington,

talked to officer Semmons and then proceeded to the Bloomington
Hills area (T. 1428).

On his way, he passed a vehicle coming in the

opposite direction which contained Gordon Hutchings (T. 1431) and
then proceeded further and caught up with his wife going in another
direction (T. 1432).

He followed her into St. George and to her

apartment (T. 1433).
At the apartment the Butlers got into an argument (T. 1435)
and Butler then called Mrs. Hutchings and advised her that the par
had been together (T. 1437).

He then handcuffed his wife with his

police handcuffs (T. 1438), removed her clothing and satisfied hin
that she had recently had intercourse (T. 1439).
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Mrs. Butler admitted for the first time that she had had intercourse
with Hutchings that evening (T. 1439).

Butler became very upset

(T. 1440) and then the telephone rang and it was Mrs. Hutchings
asking to speak to Alayne Butler. At eleven fifteen Butler left
his wife's apartment and went to the home of Joe Pfoutz, his
police sergeant.
and

He took off his badge and name tag and gun belt

told Pfoutz he was resigning (T 1444, 1445).

Pfoutz took

Butler's gun and removed the bullets from it (T. 1445).

Butler then

asked for his gun back, it being the only portion of the property
removed that belonging to him, and Pfoutz returned it. (T. 1446).
Butler replaced the bullets in the gun, placed it in his pants belt
and left (T. 1446).

He returned to his wife's apartment and continued

the argument (T. 1447) and received a telephone call from Hutchings
although did not talk to him and hung up the telephone (T. 1448).
Butler thereupon left his wife's apartment with the intent in mind of
returning the police car to the office, picking up his pickup and
leaving the area permanently (T. 1448).

During all of the time in

question Butler was very upset and somewhat irrational (T. 1142).
During the time that Butler was checking out his wife and
resiging Hutchings returned to his home (T. 360). Mrs. Hutchings
had packed his suitcase (T. 359) and subsequently asked him to leave
which he did (T. 360). Hutchings subsequently returned to the home
about eleven o'clock p.m. (T. 360).
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As Butler proceeded to the police station he decided to
report to Mrs. Hutchings what he had found out and thereupon
proceeded to the Hutchings' home (T« 1449). The Hutchings1 home
was on the route to the police station (T. 1450). Upon his arrival
at the home he observed Hutchings' pickup parked backwards in front
of the home with its lights on and the engine running (T. 1450).
He left his car and walked up and knocked on the door (T. 1452).
He heard a loud male voice that sounded like an argument (T. 1454)
and walked off the porch of the home (T. 1454).

Hutchings came to

the door, saw Butler, and rushed at him with his arms out (T. 1454,
1455).

The testimony that Hutchings rushed at Butler is verified

by Mrs. Hutchings as well as in Butler's testimony.

(For Mrs.

Hutchings' testimony, see the transcript at pages 365, 366, 446, 44
449).

Mrs. Hutchings, the only eye witness to the happening, also

testified that she thought there would be a fight (T. 450) and
that her husband went at Butler as though he were going to hit him
(T. 450), and that Hutchings, rather than Butler, was the aggressoi
(T. 451). Up to this point Butler had made no moves against Hutch:
(T. 450).
As Hutchings approached Butler, who was standing on the lawn
in front of the house

(T, 1454), he was yelling at Butler (T. 145

Butler thereupon pulled his gun from his belt and shot at Hutchinc
(T. 1455).

Butler did not remember anything that happened after •

(T, 1456), except that Hutchings ran back through the door of his
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house (T. 1456).

The state's evidence was that Hutchings ran

around the house with Butler following him and shooting at him,
although the foundation ofr this evidence is weak as will be
subsequently pointed out in argument. Hutchings was hit by four
bullets (T. 815) and subsequently passed away in his home from
loss of blood. (T. 827).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING THE STATE TO ELECT
UNDER WHICH SUBSECTION OF THE MANSLAUGHTER STATUTE THE DEFENDANT
WAS TO BE TRIED UPON.
The Information filed against the Appellant pleaded and alleged
all three subsections of the mansluaghter statute as contained in
76-5-205 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in the alternative
(R. 88, 89). Appellant filed a motion to require the State to elect
under which subsection of the statute he would be tried under
(R, 93, 94) but the lower court, after argument, refused to require
such election (R. 95). In addition, the Court, in its jury
instructions, charged the jury that it could find the Appellant
guilty of any three fo the fact situations contained in the
manslaughter statute (R. 298, 299, 301, 302, 319). In addition,
the Court submitted the matter to the Jury on three separate jury
verdict forms as set forth in each subsection of the manslaughter
statute (R. 320, 321, 322). The Information was not alleged in
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counts*

Going along with this defect is the fact that a demand

for Bill of Particulars was filed (R. 91, 92) and one was furnished
(R. 98-165), but no statement of facts the Plaintiff intended to
prove was contained therein.

Defendant made objection to this

(R. 169, 170) but no correction was made.
The allegations contained in an Information must be sufficient
to advise the accused of the accusation against him. 42 CJS 958
The accusations agasint the accused must be
sufficient to (a) identify the accused of the offense
with which he is sought to be charged, (b) protect
the accused from being twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense, (c) enable the accused to prepare for trial,
and (d) enable the court, on conviction, to pronounce
sentence according to the rights of the case. 42 CJS 959.
In general, the offense charged must be clearly
set forth in ordinary, plain, concise language, sufficient
to inform a person of common understanding of what is
intended, protect his rights, and so that the Court can
pronounce a proper judgment and the charge be understood
by the jury . . . 42 CJS 965.
An indictment, information or complaint must
directly and positively allege the commission by
accused of the crime charged and every fact necessary
to constitute it. 42 CJS 972.
A murder indictment which merely alleged that accused
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with malice aforethougl
killed a victim enable the prosecutor to change theories at
will, and therefore afforded no notice of what the
accused would be required to meet, and therefore denied
the accused's fundamental rights. Simpson v. Eighth
Judicial District Court (Nevada 1973) 503 P. 2d 1225.
A Defendant is entitled to be charged with a specific crime
so that he may know the nature and cause of the accusation againsl
him.

State v. Taylor (1963)

14 Utah 2d 107, 378 P. 2d 352.
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An Information must be sufficient to notify
the Defendant of the charge against him so that he is
able to prepare a defense, to identify the offense so
that Defendant can successfully interpose a double
jeopardy plea, and to apprise the court of the issues
before it so that the Court can properly rule on
questions of evidence and determine sufficiency thereof.
State v. Stites (1956) 5 Utah 2d 101, 297 P 2d 227.
The Information filed against Butler (R. 88, 89) charged him
with Manslaughter either by causing the death of Gordon Hutchings
recklessly or under extreme emotional disturbance or under
circumstances wherein Butler reasonably believed he had a moral or
legal justification or extenuation for his conduct.

This placed

Butler and his attorneys in the position of defending against three
separate theories of the State's lawsuit.

In addition, it gave the

prosecution the right to elect under which theory it was going to
proceed under, a situation found by the Nevada Court to be a
violation of the accused's rights as set forth in the Simpson case
above mentioned.

This problem, combined with the failure of the

State to set forth in its Bill of Particulars and Amended Bill of
Particulars the specific facts it intended to prove against the
Defendant resulted, in the opinion of the Defendant, in a violation
of his fundamental Constitutional rights.

In addition, by using

the shotgun approach, as the State did in this case, the jury was
called on to make its own election, a situation which well could
have been misleading to it.
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One further point.

The Defendant, because of the wording of

the information, was called upon to defend against what in effect
were three separate accusations without being advised as to which,
if any, the State intended to prove at trial.

Such situation,

therefore, resulted in the Defendant being put to trial without
knowing what specific accusation, if any, he had to defend against.
POINT II
IN VIEW OF THE WORDING OF THE INFORMATION, THE COURT ERRED IN
NOT REQUIRING THE STATE TO FILE A MORE SPECIFIC BILL OF PARTICULARS
SETTING FORTH THE EXACT FACTS IT INTENDED TO PROVE AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT AT TRIAL.
The error assigned in this particular point on appeal dovetails in with the assignment of error set forth in Point I above.
The Appellant, pursuant to law (77-21-9 UCA 1953; State v. Lyman
(1960) 10 Utah 2d 58, 348 P. 2d 340; State v. Courtney (1960)
10 Utah 2d 200, 350 P. 2d 619) filed a demand for a Bill of Particulars (R. 91, 92). In such demand, it asked for all evidence agains
the Defendant (R. 91). A Bill of Particulars was filed (R. 98-165)
but it did not state what the fact situation was that the State
intended to prove at trial.

The Defendant thereupon filed a motio:

for a re-hearing of its previous Motion to Require an Election und
which

theory of the Manslaughter statute the State intended to

proceed upon (R. 17 6-17 8) which motion was based upon, at least ii
part, the failure of the State to set forth what it intended to p:
in its Bill of Particulars.

The State thereupon filed an Amendme

Bill of Particulars (R- 183-184), but still did not set forth the
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facts it intended to prove.

The Court on argument of the Motion

for Re-Hearing, denied the same (R. 200). A further Amendment to
Bill of Particulars was filed by the State (R. 220), but it again,
did not set forth the facts to be proved at trial.
The purpose of a Bill of Particulars is to inform
the Defendant of the particulars of the offense
sufficiently to enable him to prepare his defense . . .
State v. Winters (1964) 16 Utah 2d 139, 396 P. 2d 872.
It must inform the Defendant of the particulars of the offense
sufficiently to enable him to prepare his defense.

77-21-9 UCA 1953.

The Bill of Particulars and its amendments filed by the
prosecution in the Butler case do not do this.

It does list the

witnesses that may be used at trial and gives certain copies of
witnesses' statements and other evidencary reports, however there is
no commitment that any or all of these items will be presented at
trial, or what ones, if any, will be.

This defect, combined with the

allegations set forth in the Information as above mentioned, placed
the Defendant in the position of not knowing what he was to defend
against.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCUSING CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE JURY VENIRE
PRIOR TO TRIAL AND WITHOUT HEARING WITH THE DEFENDANT PRESENT AND
WITHOUT DISCLOSING TO THE DEFENDANT THE REASON FOR SUCH EXCUSAL.
The jury venire list for the Butler case is found in the
record at pages 237 through 239. Those names opposite to which
certain red writing is found were excused for one reason or another
at the time the trial jury was being selected.

Certain of the jury
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venire did not appear for jury selection and opposite their names
is the word "removed" in black writing (R. 193, 194). Defendant
filed a Motion for Disclosure as to why such persons were removed
from the jury venire (R. 191, 192). The only action taken by the
Court was a direction by it to "obtain such information from the
Court Reporter"

(R. 233). At no place in the record is there a

statement by the court as to why these persons were removed by the
judge and as a practical matter it is the position of the Defendant
stated on information and belief, that the Court never made a record
as to why these people were excused from the venire.

Certainly such

action was taken by the Court out of the presence of the Defendant
although the people who were so "removed" were duly selected
according to law to sit on the Butler venire.
It is the position of the Defendant that the named persons shou
not have been removed without a hearing in front of the Defendant,
or at least, disclosure should have been made to show why they were
removed.
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW CERTAIN EVIDENCE
INTO THE RECORD AND BEFORE THE JURY GOING TO THE STATE OF MIND OF
THE DEFENDANT ON THE BASIS OF HEARSAY OR OTHERWISE.
The Utah Manslaughter statute, as contained in 7 6-5-205, Utah
Code Annotated 1953 as amended, by its very nature and wording pla
into issue the state of mind of the accused and the reasonableness

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 15 -

or propriety of his actions.

In addition, because of the fact

situation involved in the Butler case and because of the fact that
Hutchings in fact attacked Butler, the element of self-defense was
present.

The trial court recognized that the jury could properly

consider the defense of self-defense as it gave the jury three
instructions in that regard (R, 306, 307, 308). In Utah, of course,
the defense of self-defense is defined and recognized in 76-2-402,
Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended and the definitions of the
various key words used in the manslaughter statute are defined in
76-2-103.

As a result, and because of the wording of the manslaughter

statute and the statutes and jury instructions on self-defense, the
state of mind of the accused became an issue and the jury was called
upon to determine it and the propriety of his actions.
At various places in the record there appear situations in
which the defense attempted to get into evidence certain sexual
indiscretions of Alayne Butler.

The lower court took the position

that unless Butler had knowledge of such acts prior to the death
of Hutchings that such evidence was not proper to present to the jury.
This position was probably correct.

There are instances however,

going both to the sexual indiscretions of Mrs. Butler and to threats
made by Hutchings against Butler that Butler knew about and the
court refused to let this evidence before the jury.

In this regard,

it is the position of the Defendant that such evidence should have
been allowed in the record.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 16 -

At one point in the Defendant's testimony he commenced to
testify as to a conversation he had had with his wife wherein
she was going to tell him of a conversation she had had with one
Marvin Jones about threats made by Hutchings to Jones against Butler
(T. 1388).

The State objected on the basis of hearsay (T. 1388)f am

the Court sustained the objection (T. 1388, 1389).

The Defendant

thereupon requested to make a proffer of proof for the record
outside the hearing of the jury as to the evidence claiming that
the testimony would go to the state of mind of the Defendant
(T. 1389).

The Court allowed this and the jury was excused.

Butler

testified that his wife had told him that Marvin Jones had told her
that Hutchings made threats against Butler and his physical
well being and had warned Mrs. Butler to keep Butler away from
Hutchings (T. 1390, 1391).

The Court sustained the State's

objection and refused to allow the testimony before the jury (T. 13?
Immediately after this ruling the jury was called back and Butler
proceeded to testify as to the same conversation with his wife.

He

proceeded to tell what that conversation was, the State objected
on the grounds of hearsay, the Court overruled and denied the
objection,, and Mr. Butler testified that his wife had stated that
Hutchings had threatened Butler with bodily harm (T. 1393, 1394).
Obviously the above mentioned rulings of the lower court were
inconsistent.

It is the position of the Defendant that the lattei

ruling was correct and that any testimony going to threats made b
Hutchings against Butler that Butler knew about should have been
- - — ^ ^fore the jury.
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Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence, defines hearsay and its
exceptions.

In effect, the Rule defines hearsay as an out of court

statement offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.

If the

Court will examine the trial transcript setting forth the above
two mentioned rulings of the court it will note that throughout the
presentation of this testimony counsel for Defendant mentioned several
times that the conversations and their substance were not being
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated, but were being
offered to show the state of mind of the Defendant (T. 1388-1394).
There is no question but that the state of mind of the Defendant was
an issue both under the Manslaughter statute, the statute on selfdefense and under the jury instructions given to the jury by the
Court.

Also, the trial Court itself was inconsistent, refusing to

let the statements into evidence at one time and immediately thereafter
allowing the same type of evidence in.

It can't be right in both

instances.
It is difficult for an appellant Court, reviewing a cold
record, to get a feel of the emotions flowing in a case such as the
Butler case. We have a situation wherein Butler was a young man
employed by the same police department, with the wife having an
affair with the brother of the chief of police.

The record up to

the time of the shooting shows many instances of Butler talking to
his fellow officers about the matter, his attempts to stop the
affair and his deep concern and emotional disturbance over the thing.
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V
POINT v
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING CERTAIN EVIDENCE INTO THE
RECORD AND BEFORE THE JURY BECAUSE OF LACK OF PROPER FOUNDATION.
The theory of the State's case was that Butler fired a shot
or two toward Hutchings while both parties were on the front lawn
of the Hutchings home and then followed Hutchings around to the Sou
of the home still firing shots. Mrs. Hutchings, the only eye
witness to the occurance, testified she heard two shots fired in
front of the house and then went to call the police and didn't kno^
what happened after that (T. 366). As mentioned abovef Butler cou
not remember what happened after the first shot.

As a result, the

are no eye witnesses to what happened after the firing of the firs
two shots.
The
therefore,
to
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the physical evidence available to it and must present said
evidence so that it is relevant and properly connected to the
Defendant.

In other words, it must lay a proper foundation for its

admission.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 is a frontal picture of the Hutchings
home showing the front door, the lawn, and the South (left hand)
side of the home with its attendant car parking area and a red
Volkswagon automobile which will be mentioned later.

Defendant did

not object to its admission as an exhibit. Exhibit P-3 is another
picture of the Hutchings home.
Exhibit P-25 is the weapon used in the shooting and was
identified as belonging to Butler (T. 534, 535). It is a Smith &
Wesson .357 Magnum Revolver.

Certain .357 cartridges were taken

from the weapon and identified for purposes of the record as
Exhibit P~26.

It was the testimony of Mr. Blackburn, the FBI weapons

expert, that Exhibit P-25 had fired the cartridges identified as
Exhibit P-26.
The officers making the investigation found a bullet slug at
the scene identified as Exhibit P-32.

They found a second bullet

identified as Exhibit P-31 and a third identified as Exhibit P-30.
A fourth bullet was identifed as Exhibit P-29-

With the exceptions

of Exhibit P-29, which was identified as being of .357 calibre, the
expert identified the other bullets as being of .38 calibre.

The

testimony of Mr. Blackburn, the FBI expert was to the effect that
he could not positively say that any of these bullets came from the
weapon identified as belonging to Butler.

The reason for this,
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according to the expert, was that there were not sufficient marks
on the bullets to make such an identification-

This is extremely

strange as an examination of at least three of the bullet exhibits
will show them to be relatively undamaged.

The Defendant objected

to the admission of the bullet exhibits on the basis that they were
not properly connected to the Defendant (T. 704). Also, Exhibit
P-28 was a metal fragment found near the rear of the house and
identified as a sliver of a bullet, however the witness could not
say where it came from noi: could any other witness.

Defendant

objected to its admission on the basis that it could in no way be
tied either to the Defendant or his weapon, which it was not (T. 704
The Court allowed all of the bullet exhibits into evidence over the
Defendant's objection (T. 708) although it obviously had reservatioi
as to Exhibit P-28, the metal fragment found at the rear of the
house (T. 708).
It is Defendant's position that the allowing of these bullet
exhibits into evidence, and especially P-28 found at the rear of t]
home, constituted reversable error as they could not be connected
with the Defendant.

This is especially true with Exhibit P-28 as

it could not be identified other than as a piece of a metal bullel
slug and could not in any way be shown as coming from a gun of th<
type owned by Butler.

As the evidence showing that Butler went

around the home to shoot at Hutchings must be circumstantial, the
being no eye witnesses, this evidence must be properly tied to h:
The metal fragment

(Ex. P-28) could not have been placed there
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Butler unless he had gone to the rear of the home, and as a result,
to allow such damaging evidence into the record should necessitate
more of a foundation than just the fact that such fragment existed,
which is all the State presented.
Exhibit P-7 is a photograph depicting the right rear fender and
tire of a red Volkswagen (T. 721). This vehicle was located to the
left rear of the Hutchings home.

(See Exhibits P-2 and P-3).

Defendant assumes that it was intended by the State by the introduction of this exhibit to show an alleged bullet hole in the rear
fender.

There is nothing in the record to show what caused the

hole or when it was caused.

Defendant objected to the receipt of this

exhibit as evidence on the basis of improper foundation (T. 938, 939)
but the same was overruled and denied by the Court and allowed
into the record as an exhibit (T. 947). In this regard, it is
interesting to note in examining the exhibit that the tire shown is
flat and one would logically assume that if a bullet went through
the fender that it casued the flat tire.

Such was not the case, as

the tire was. flat prior to the shooting and thus could not have been
caused by Gary Butler or his gun.

Defendant takes the position that

the receipt of Exhibit P-7 was improper and constituted error in that
no evidence is present as to what caused che hole in the fender or
when it was caused.
Exhibit P-14 is a picture of a metal container with a hole
in it.

This container was located to the left rear of the

Hutchings home.

The apparent theory of the State in offering this
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exhibit was to show that Butler went to the left rear of the home
shooting Hutchings. At no place in the record is there any
testimony as to what caused the hole or when it was placed in the
metal container.

The court received the exhibit as evidence over

Defendant's objections*

The same reasoning applies to this exhibit

as to Exhibit P-7 in that it was not connected in any manner with the
Defendant and no cause was shown for its admission as an exhibit.
By the admission of both Exhibit P-7 and Exhibit P-14 the Court
allowed matters to come before the jury without proper foundation
that could be misleading to the jury and highly prejudicial to the
Defendant.
Exhibits P-12, P-13 and P-14 were photographs introduced by
the State to prove its theory that Hutchings in fact ran around to
the rear of his home with Butler following.
depict alleged blood stains.

They were intended to

At no place in the record is there

anything that would indicate that the red stains show shown were
blood.

As a result, the Court, by admitting these three exhibits

committed error in that they were not properly identified and no
proper foundation was laid as to what they depicted.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that for the reasons above
mentioned, the verdict of Guilty rendered against the Defendant in
the lower court should be reversed and the Defendant be given a ne
trial.
Respectfully submitted.
PATRICK H. FENTION
13 West Hoover Avenue
Cedar City, Utah 84720

PHILLIP L. FOREMASTS
494 East Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 847
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